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Abstract: This paper investigates the explanatory power of social convention theory for explaining 
the persistence of female genital cutting (FGC) in a broad sample of African countries. While 
influential in policy circles, the idea that FGC is best described as a bad equilibrium in a social 
coordination game has recently been challenged by quantitative evidence from selected countries. 
These studies have pointed towards the importance of private preferences. We use novel 
approaches to test whether FGC is social interdependent when decisions also depend on private 
preferences. We test implications of the simple fact that according to social convention theory 
mothers will sometimes cut their daughters even if they do not support the practice. The substantial 
regional variation in FGC practices warrants investigation in a broad sample. Empirical results 
drawing on Demographic and Health Survey data from 34 surveys performed between 1992-2018 
in 11 African countries suggest that cutting behavior is indeed often socially interdependent, and 
hence that it can be understood as a social convention. Our findings indicate that even if social 
convention theory does not provide the full picture, it should not be dismissed. Accordingly, 
interventions that acknowledge the social interdependence of cutting behavior are likely to be more 
successful than interventions that do not. 
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In this paper we investigate the persistence of female genital cutting – a practice affecting an 
estimated 200 million women and girls in 30 countries worldwide (UNICEF, 2016). Female 
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genital cutting5 refers to procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female 
genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons (WHO, 2008). 
On top of the immediate health risks involved, which include severe pain, excessive bleeding 
or even death (from, e.g., infections or haemorrhage), the practice can have severe long-term 
physiological and psychological effects (WHO, 2008), with  consequences for the health, 
educational attainment, labor market outcomes, and productivity of women in societies where 
the practice is widespread (Bellemare et al., 2015).  
 Despite a significant anthropological literature on the existence of FGC in different 
countries around the world (Shell-Duncan et al. 2011), there is still little consensus about why 
it continues to be practiced. Until recently, the most influential theory to explain why FGC 
persists in spite of its harmful consequences has been social convention theory, according to 
which FGC is a bad equilibrium in a social coordination game (Mackie, 1996). Cutting is 
interpreted as a coordinated practice that families use to prepare their daughters for marriage, 
and individual parents who divert from local FGC norms harm their daughter’s chances on 
the marriage market. As such, the prevalence of FGC in the community is critical to a family’s 
decision about whether or not to cut their daughter. Hence, the FGC decision is socially 
interdependent, that is, it depends on what others in the community are doing (Bicchieri, 
2017). Strictly interpreted6, social convention theory suggests that a critical threshold – or 
tipping point – exists such that, if the share of families who cut their daughters and demand 
cut wives for their sons is above the threshold, all families have an incentive to cut. If the 
share of families is below the threshold, however, the probability of finding husbands without 
cutting one’s daughter is sufficiently high for families to reap the benefits of marriage without 
the health costs of cutting, and the rate of FGC should fall to zero (see the discussion in 
Hayford and Trinitapoli, 2011 and Efferson et al., 2015).  
The over-arching aim of this paper is to investigate the explanatory power of social 
convention theory for explaining the persistence of female genital cutting in a broad sample 
of African countries, the broadest to date. We use novel empirical procedures to determine if 
                                                            
5 Also known as female genital mutilation and female circumcision. Whereas the former, used by e.g. the WHO, 
is intended to emphasize the gravity of the act, the latter translates the terms used in African languages more 
accurately, but on the other hand signals that the practice is comparable with male circumcision (which it is not). 
The term female genital cutting, or FGC, which we use in this paper, can be seen as a middle way. ‘Cutting’ is 
a more neutral term than ‘mutilation’, but still does not downplay the gravity of the practice. For a discussion of 
the terminology, see e.g. Yoder et al. (2013). 
6 With strictly interpreted we mean an interpretation where the decision to cut or not to cut the daughter only 
depends on what others think and do.  
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behavior is socially interdependent in a context where it may also depend on private 
preferences, where private preferences depend on the utility that the mother would get from 
cutting her daughter if there was no social consequences.7 That is, mothers may have varying 
preferences for the practice, depending on their beliefs about benefits and costs that are not of 
a social nature. 
 We present a simple model that incorporates both private and social utility of female 
genital cutting. It illustrates that interior equilibria are possible even in the presence of social 
interdependence and that corner solutions are possible also without social interdependence. 
Hence, we cannot test for social interdependence using only information about community 
FGC rates. As mentioned, the model captures the fact that social convention theory implies 
that people will sometimes act against their own convictions.  
 Our empirical approach builds on this simple fact: social convention theory implies that 
parents whose private preferences are not in favor of FGC will sometimes still cut their 
daughter if the community FGC rate is high enough. Conversely, parents whose private 
preferences are in favor of FGC may sometimes abstain from cutting their daughter if the 
community FGC rate is low enough, even if proponents of social convention theory has not 
emphasized this. To test implications of this fact, we use information about respondents’ 
private preferences and the cutting of daughters. First, we test whether the community FGC 
rate remains a significant predictor of the decision to cut one’s daughter when we account for 
mothers’ private FGC preferences in a regression framework. Second, we compare the 
distributions of reported cutting of daughters and reported preferences for FGC in 
communities. If the cutting decision is socially interdependent, such that mothers who do not 
favour FGC do sometimes cut their daughter if FGC rates are high enough, the distribution of 
cutting behaviour should be more extreme than the distribution of private cutting preferences. 
Third, we compare the relationship between the community FGC rate and cutting of daughters 
for mothers who support FGC and mothers who do not support FGC. If the cutting decision 
is socially interdependent this relationship should be more concave for mothers who support 
FGC than for mothers who do not, again since mothers who do not favour FGC will 
sometimes still choice to cut their daughters when community FGC rates are high. Importantly 
the last two tests should be robust to misreporting (see the discussion in Section 5). 
 The analysis draws on Demographic and Health Survey data from 34 surveys performed 
between 1992-2018 in 11 African countries. The data consist in mother-daughter pairs with 
                                                            
7 Gulesci et al. (2021) use the term intrinsic utility. 
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information on the FGC status of both mothers and daughters as well as on a wide range of 
covariates. We find that the community cut rate, measured among co-ethnics from the same 
region born 1-6 years before the daughter, remains a strong predictor of the daughters’ FGC 
status even when we control for mothers’ private preferences in a regression framework. 
Furthermore, the distribution of cutting behavior is indeed more extreme than the distribution 
of private preferences in the pooled sample and in the majority of separate country samples. 
Also suggestive of social interdependence, the relationship between the community cut rate 
and the cutting of daughters is more concave for mothers’ who support FGC than for mothers’ 
who do not in the pooled sample and in the majority of the individual country samples.  
 Taken together, our results thus suggest that cutting behavior is often socially 
interdependent, and hence that it can be understood as a social convention. Even if, as earlier 
studies have shown, social convention theory does not provide the full picture, it should not 
be dismissed. This implies that interventions which acknowledge the social interdependence 
of cutting behavior are likely to be more successful than interventions that do not. 
 In complementary analysis, we first endogenize mothers’ private preferences by 
considering the intergenerational transmission of values. We test whether the community 
FGC rate remains a significant predictor of the FGC of daughters when we account for 
mothers’ own FGC status. We find that it does, even if mothers’ own FGC status is in itself a 
strong predictor of whether or not the daughter is cut. In a subsample of mother-daughter pairs 
where the mother has moved between regions and we have information about where she lived 
before, we also control for the influence of the FGC rate in the community where the mother 
grew up. The vertical transmission channel appear to be influential, but the community cut 
rate remains an important predictor when we control for it. In the subsample of “movers”, in 
addition to mothers’ FGC status, both the FGC rate in the current community and that in the 
community where the mother grew up predict whether or not daughters are cut. Hence, both 
intergenerational transmission of values and beliefs and social conventions theory have 
explanatory power. 
 Second, and along the lines of earlier studies, we investigate the distributions of FGC 
rates across communities and over time for our broader sample of African countries. This 
analysis can be seen as a test of a strict version of social convention theory, not allowing for 
variation in private preferences. Since we only need respondents’ own FGC status for this 
analysis, we can use an even broader sample than in the main analysis. Specifically, we i) 
investigate the extent to which community FGC rates are close to zero or one with a sharp 
discontinuity at some threshold value of the community FGC rate and ii) for large ethnic 
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groups we investigate whether there appear to be stable internal equilibria where some girls 
are cut and other girls are not. The distribution of community FGC rates is in line with a strict 
interpretation of social convention theory in a few countries, but in the pooled sample and in 
most individual country samples, it is not. Following communities over time shows that most 
have stable extreme FGC rates (close to zero or one) or steadily declining ones, but some 
appear to have stable interior FGC rates. 
 Social convention theory has had a major influence on the efforts of key development 
agencies to end FGC (see e.g. UNICEF, 2010; UNICEF, 2013; WHO, 2008). As formulated 
in the UN interagency statement on female genital mutilation (WHO, 2008, p. 13), the 
conventional nature of FGC “requires a significant number of families within a community to 
make a collective, coordinated choice to abandon the practice”. Efferson et al. (2015) describe 
a typical intervention as consisting in development workers trying to convince families in a 
community to abandon cutting. Once they estimate that they have enough families to cross 
the critical threshold, they organize a public declaration. The hope is that this will lead the 
remaining families to realize that abandoning the practice is now in their own interest. Hence, 
whether or not FGC is socially interdependent is highly policy relevant. If there is an 
important element of social interdependence, community level interventions that bring people 
together to discuss and agree to abandon the practice are likely to be more efficient than 
interventions that lack a social component, which are less likely to affect expectations about 
the FGC decisions of others. 
 However, recent quantitative evidence from selected countries has challenged the 
explanatory power of social convention theory in the case of FGC (Bellemare et al., 2015; 
Efferson et al., 2015; Novak, 2020). Efferson et al. (2015) find in their Sudanese sample that 
community level cutting rates vary continuously along the full spectrum, rather than being 
extremely high or extremely low and displaying a clear discontinuity suggestive of 
coordination, leading them to state that “Female genital cutting is not a social coordination 
norm”.  Novak (2020) investigates the variation in FGC rates within communities over time 
in Burkina Faso to search for either universal tipping points, as would be suggested by social 
convention theory strictly interpreted, or stable interior equilibria where some members in the 
community cut their daughters while others do not. She finds that while some communities 
appear to have tipping points after which the FGC rate falls to zero, others display stable 
interior equilibria. Bellemare et al. (2015) find that attitudes to female genital cutting in West 
Africa depend more on household- and individual-level determinants than on village-level 
factors. However, their study focuses on attitudes rather than behavior, and is not designed to 
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evaluate the explanatory power of social convention theory for FGC. Mackie (1996) argues 
that a defining feature of the convention is that in communities where it is practiced, it is 
practiced even by those who oppose it. Indeed, Akinsanya and Gbadebo (2011), who study 
FGC practices in Nigeria, find that many of the respondents who claimed they did not approve 
of FGC still practiced the act (and correspondingly, those who did not cut their daughters did 
not necessarily do so because of non-approval). A key question, according to Mackie and 
LeJeune (2009), is how FGC can persist even in areas where attitudes have turned against it. 
As outlined above, our model and empirical analysis capture the fact that social convention 
theory implies that people will act against their own convictions to avoid costs of deviating 
from the social convention.  
 In summary, both Efferson (2015) and Novak (2020) reject a strict version of social 
convention theory, where the cutting decision depends only on what others in the community 
are doing. Rather, they suggest that the private preferences for FGC is important for the 
decision of whether or not to cut one’s daughter. However, it is difficult to separate social 
interdependence from community level correlation in private preferences, and previous 
studies have not been able to empirically test the extent to which FGC is also socially 
interdependent.  
 We make several contributions to the literature. We make an immediate contribution to 
the literature evaluating the explanatory power of social convention theory for FGC 
(Bellemare et al., 2015; Efferson et al., 2015; Novak, 2020) originally developed by Mackie 
(1996). Earlier studies have demonstrated that individual private preferences appear to matter. 
We test implications of social convention theory when decisions depend on private utility in 
addition to social utility. We also contribute by using the largest sample to date (namely all 
African countries engaging in the practice and for which data is available). This is important 
considering the substantial regional variation in FGC practices (see the discussion in Section 
2), and the multiple potential mechanisms involved.  
 We also contribute to the emerging literature on interventions to eradicate FGC (see e.g. 
Shell-Duncan et al., 2011, 2013; Camilotti, 2015; Vogt et al., 2016; García-Hombrados and 
Salgado, 2019). Our study provides insights about whether or not it is beneficial to organize 
interventions collectively in communities.  
 In more general terms, the study contributes to the literature exploring factors (not related 
to social convention theory specifically) affecting FGC practices (see e.g. Poyker, 2016, on 
the role of regime stability; Vogt et al., 2016, on the impact of information campaigns; Becker, 
2019, on the role of pastoralism and paternal uncertainty; Harari, 2019, on the impact of 
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inheritance rights, Diabate and Mesple-Somps, 2019, on the role of return migrants for norm 
transmission, and Corno et al., 2020, on the impact of slave trade), as well as the persistence 
of other deeply rooted harmful practices (Alesina et al., 2021).  
 Last but not least, we contribute to the general social norms literature (e.g. Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2006; Tabellini, 2008; Acemoglu and Jackson, 2015, 2017; Bicchieri, 2017; Ali and 
Bénabou, 2020; Bursztyn et al., 2020) by providing novel procedures to test for social 
interdependence using data on attitudes and behaviors  
 
2 Background on FGC practices 
The term female genital cutting describes a broad range of practices performed on girls, 
mostly before the age of 15 and often in infancy or early childhood (UNICEF, 2013). The 
long-term health risks include chronic pain, infections, excessive scar tissue, urinary and 
menstrual problems, painful sexual intercourse, an increased risk for HIV infection due to 
bleeding during intercourse, birth complications, dangers to the newborn, and psychological 
consequences such as anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (WHO, 2008). The World 
Health Organization (2018) classifies FGC into four types. In the first type, clitoridectomy, 
the clitoris is partially or totally removed. In the second type, excision, both the clitoris and 
the labia are partially or totally removed. In the third and most extreme type, infibulation, the 
vaginal opening is narrowed by cutting, repositioning and sometimes stitching together the 
labia. The fourth type includes all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-
medical purposes, e.g. pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterizing the genital area. 
 Historically, FGC is thought to have originated as a custom to constrain women’s 
sexuality. Anthropological studies suggest that customs restricting female sexuality serve the 
function of reducing paternity uncertainty, and thus disproportionately tend to appear in 
environments where mate guarding is difficult (Mackie, 1996; Becker, 2019; Corno et al., 
2020).  
 Laws banning FGC have been passed in the majority of African countries (see Table A1), 
but vary significantly in terms of their degree of restriction and enforcement (see the 
discussion in Shell-Duncan et al., 2013). Perhaps most notably, even in countries where FGC 
is illegal, it is still often widely practiced. 
 There is substantial regional variation in prevalence and type of FGC practiced (see Table 
A1). The concentration of FGC is particularly high in northern East Africa; in Somalia (not 
in our sample), Egypt and Sudan estimated prevalence rates range between 87 and 98 percent 
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(Orchid Project, 2021). Furthermore, the rate of infibulation is much higher here than 
elsewhere. FGC is also concentrated in some West African countries – Burkina Faso, the 
Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone – with estimated prevalence rates ranging 
from 50 (Liberia) to 97 percent (Guinea). 
 While accounts of variation in FGC practices commonly cite cultural variables, such as 
ethnicity and religion, it is worth emphasizing that an ethnic or religious explanation of FGC 
is not sufficient (Mackie and LeJeune, 2009). First, FGC is practiced in a wide variety of 
ethnic and religious groups, and second, the practice is often not universal within the broader 
group, but rather focused within certain subgroups. With respect to religion, there are both 
Christian and Muslim communities who practice FGC, often believing that the practice is 
required by the holy book. Yet, nearby communities of the same religion may not engage in 
the practice, and worldwide most Christians and most Muslims clearly do not. 
 Justifications offered for practicing FGC differ across groups, but marriageability is still 
perhaps the most common reason offered across practicing communities, irrespective of 
ethnicity, religion and severity of cutting (Mackie and LeJeune, 2009). In line with this idea, 
Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010) model FGC as a pre-marital investment. Similarly, 
García-Hombrados and Salgado (2019) suggest that education and FGC work as substitutes 
in the marriage market and that educational investments are affected by the cost of alternative 
pre-marital investments, such as FGC. Empirical findings from Senegal support this view. 
Based on DHS data from 13 African countries, Wagner (2015) shows that conditional on e.g. 
ethnic group, village and age, women who have undergone FGC are more likely to be married. 
In the next section, we will present a simple model where parents’ decision regarding whether 
or not to cut their daughter depends on both private preferences and social forces.  
 
3 Theoretical framework 
Below we sketch a simple model to illustrate our argument of an interplay between private 
and social utility in the decision of whether or not to cut a daughter. The model, which is 
inspired by Novak (2020) and Gulesci et al. (2021), shows that investigating the distribution 
of community FGC rates is not enough to test social convention theory; all types of 
distributions are theoretically possible regardless of whether households respond to the 
behavior of other households in the community or not. The model also demonstrates how 
households may go against their private preferences if social norms (either for or against FGC) 
are sufficiently strong, and how this can be used to test social convention theory.   
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 We refer to mothers as the primary unit of analysis and abstract from intra-household 
bargaining.8 Mothers can choose between two actions 𝐴 = {0,1}, where 0 is not to cut her 
daughter and 1 is to cut her daughter. Mothers choose the action that maximizes her utility, 
where the utility function consists of one private and one social component. The private 
component captures utility from doing what the mother personally believes is right for the 
daughter if there were no social consequences of the decision. The social component captures 
social utility, which depends on reactions of others to the decision, i.e. marriage market 
consequences and other types of social rewards or punishments. 
 Let 𝛾  be the private utility associated with cutting or not cutting the daughter for mother 
i in community c. 𝛾  will depend on the mother’s values and beliefs about (nonsocial) costs 
and benefits of female genital cutting. For example, it will matter whether she believes that 
cutting is an important religious or ceremonial act, possible beliefs about adverse 
consequences at childbirth, perceptions of health costs, etc. We allow values and beliefs, and 
thus private preferences, to be correlated within communities, but also to display within-
community variation.9 Without loss of generality, we normalize the private utility of not 
cutting the daughter to 0. Thus, 𝛾 is the perceived private net benefit of cutting the daughter, 
which can be either positive or negative.  
 Let 𝑟  be the cut rate in the community, where 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 1. Let 𝑠 (𝑟 ) be the social benefit 
of cutting or not cutting daughters. The social benefits include for example differences in 
expected marriage outcomes and other possible social rewards. In line with Novak (2020), we 
make a number of simplifying assumptions about the nature of the social utility.  First, we 
assume that the community cut rate is observable and that mothers are norm-takers, i.e. they 
accept the prevailing norms in the community, rather than trying to shape the norms 
themselves.10 Second, we assume that the social benefit of cutting daughters is increasing in 
the community cut rate, while the social benefit of not cutting daughters is decreasing in the 
                                                            
8 Gulesci et al. (2021) identify mothers as the main decision-makers regarding daughters FGC in their Somalian 
sample. According to their argument, fathers sometimes participate in the decision, while extended family 
members rarely do so. This is also in line with the general finding from the anthropological literature that women 
are typically the primary decision-makers when it comes to FGC (see e.g. Mackie, 1996; Shell_Duncan et al., 
2011).  
9 In models of cultural transmission of values and beliefs there will often be convergence in communities. But 
heterogeneity may exist both as a stable equilibria and along the convergence process (Bisin and Verdier, 2000; 
2001; Giavazzi et al., 2019). 
10 In many cultures, the FGC procedure involves ceremony and celebration (see e.g. Wagner, 2015). In the 
communities Efferson et al. (2015) study in Sudan, for instance, henna is applied to a girl’s feet when she is cut, 
and in Sierra Leone and Liberia, FGC is practiced as part of an initiation into a secret society for women (Yoder 
et al., 2013).  
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community cut rate, 𝑟 . More specifically we assume 𝑠 (𝑟 ) = 0  and 𝑠 (𝑟 ) > 0 when 𝑟 = 0 
while 𝑠 (𝑟 ) > 0  and 𝑠 (𝑟 ) = 0 when 𝑟 = 1. Moreover, we assume that households and 
communities can vary in their sensitivity to social norms, captured by a sensitivity parameter 
𝛼 .11  
 Given the above, the utility function for a mother that chooses to cut her daughter is 𝑉 =
𝛾 + 𝛼 𝑠 (𝑟 ) while the utility function for a mother that chooses not to cut her daughter is 
𝑉 = 𝛼 𝑠 (𝑟 ). Taken together, this implies that a mother will choose to cut her daughter if 
𝑉 − 𝑉 = 𝛾 + 𝛼 𝑠 (𝑟 ) − 𝑠 (𝑟 ) > 0.       (1) 
From equation 1 we can see that in the extreme case where there is no individual 
household variation in the parameters, we should observe community cutting rates of either 
𝑟 = 0 or 𝑟 = 1 for the following reasons: 
1) If 𝛼 > 0, then there will be a unique threshold value of 𝑟  above which all mothers 
will choose to cut their daughters and below which no one will choose to cut their 
daughters. This threshold value 𝑟∗ , or tipping point, is the value of 𝑟  where 𝛾 +
𝛼 𝑠 (𝑟 ) = 𝛼 𝑠 (𝑟 ). In this case, the theory predicts that within a given community, 
if 𝑟 < 𝑟∗ then no household should choose to cut their daughters while if 𝑟 > 𝑟∗ then 
all households should choose to cut their daughters. 
2) If 𝛼 = 0, then the community cut rate is irrelevant to the household’s decision to cut 
their daughters or not, and only the identical private utility will matter, i.e. 𝛾 ⋛ 0. 
Here we would observe either 𝑟 = 0, when 𝛾 < 0, or 𝑟 = 1, when 𝛾 > 0. The 
difference from the scenario above is that there is no threshold level of  𝑟  that would 
induce households to change their cutting behavior. 
However, with individual variation in the parameters of equation 1, it is no longer certain 
that we will only observe community cutting rates of either 𝑟 = 0 or 𝑟 = 1. Again, there are 
two potential scenarios: 
                                                            
11 Realistically, social benefits are likely to vary between communities for a given 𝑟  since the relative social 
importance of the practice may vary between communities, implying that 𝑠   and 𝑠  would vary between 
communities. However, given that we assume α varies between communities, we choose to adopt a more general 
functional form for social benefits for the sake of simplicity. 
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1) In the case where 𝛼 > 0, there will no longer be a unique threshold level of 𝑟∗, but 
rather each mother will potentially have her own threshold value 𝑟∗ . This individual 
threshold level will be determined where 𝛾 + 𝛼 𝑠 (𝑟 ) = 𝛼 𝑠 (𝑟 ). 
2) If on the other hand 𝛼 = 0, then each mother will decide whether or not to cut her 
daughters based solely on her private preferences, i.e. whether 𝛾 ⋛ 0.12 
Both of the scenarios above raise the possibility of intermediate levels of cutting within 
the community, 𝑟 ∈ (0,1), rather than separating equilibria. As shown by for example 
Schelling (1978), Granovetter (1978) and Novak (2020), heterogeneous thresholds within the 
community imply the possible existence of one or more stable internal equilibria where some 
community members cut and others do not. In the second scenario, the community cut rate 
does not play a role in household cutting behaviour, and we would therefore expect a stable 
internal equilibrium with no tipping points. 
 From the above discussion, it is clear that all types of equilibrium behavior are 
theoretically possible regardless of the role of private- and social utility, while social 
convention theory is only relevant in the cases where α > 0. For social convention theory to 
be useful to understand the persistence of FGC, and for designing interventions to encourage 
abandonment of the practise, households should respond to what other households are doing 
and thinking, i.e. to the community cut rate. We thus need a way to disentangle the individual 
motivations from the social ones. To do so we will make use of information regarding 
mothers’ private preferences. In particular, α > 0 implies the following:   
 Testable implication 1: There will be a positive association between households’ cutting 
behaviour and community cut rates when we control for mothers’ private preferences. 
 If mothers respond to the community cut rate, we should observe a positive association 
between cutting behaviour and community cut rates when we control for mothers’ private 
preferences (a related implication is that in general we cannot distinguish between an impact 
of community cut rates and correlated values and beliefs within the community unless we 
control for private preferences). 
If both private preferences and social norms play a role, some households will go against their 
own preferences when the social benefits of doing so are sufficiently high. According to the 
                                                            
12 If 𝛼 > 0 for some households and 𝛼 = 0 for others, then some households decide to cut or not according 
to scenario 1) and some according to scenario 2). 
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model, households who oppose the practise will cut their daughter if𝛼 𝑠 (𝑟 ) − 𝑠 (𝑟 ) >
𝛾 , which is more likely the higher 𝑟  is. Correspondingly, some households who support 
the practise will abstain from cutting their daughter if 𝛼 𝑠 (𝑟 ) − 𝑠 (𝑟 ) > 𝛾 , which is 
more likely the lower 𝑟  is. In other words, mothers who do not support FGC sometimes cut 
their daughters when the community FGC rate is high enough, and mothers who support FGC 
sometimes abstain from cutting their daughter when the community FGC rate is low enough. 
This has two implications that we will test in the empirical analysis:  
 Testable implication 2: The community cut rates of daughters will take more extreme 
values than the community rate of support for FGC. 
 Testable implication 3: The relationship between the community FGC rate and the 
decision of whether to cut one’s daughter will be more concave among mothers who support 
FGC than among mothers who do not support the practice. Put differently, cut rates among 
households who oppose and among households who agree with the practise will be closer at 
very high and very low community cut rates than at intermediate community cut rates.  
 
 4. Data and sample construction 
In order to investigate the explanatory power of social convention theory for FGC in a wide 
sample, we use data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS, 2021). We compile 49 
cross-sectional datasets collected in 15 African countries between 1990 and 2019 that have 
information about FGC status of respondents and daughters: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauretania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan and Tanzania. 
 Information about the FGC status of daughters was collected differently in different 
surveys. The oldest surveys (1990-2003) asked about the oldest daughter. In between surveys 
(1995-2013) asked if any daughter was cut, and then specific questions on the most recently 
cut daughter. The later surveys (2005 and later) asked about FGC status of all daughters up 
until an age cut-off, usually 15 but sometimes 16 or 17. Table A2 shows the availability of 
data on daughters’ FGC status and how this information was collected for each survey. To get 
a measure that is comparable across countries and survey rounds, we focus on the FGC status 
of the oldest daughter. In most survey rounds, we thus assume that the oldest daughter is cut 
if any daughter is reported to be so. There is support for this assumption in the finding that it 
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is very rare that some daughter(s) are cut and other daughter(s) are not, given the younger 
daughters are old enough (Hayford and Trinitapoli, 2011).   
 Cut ages vary across (as well as within) countries. We only use observations where the 
oldest daughter is above the age at which 95% of cut women in the country are reported to 
have been so. For the latest surveys where we only know FGC status of daughters below some 
cut-off age, the oldest observed daughter has to be above the 95% cut-age. In some countries, 
such as Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania where it is common to have the procedure 
during adolescence, this removes nearly all observations from the latest surveys. Column 3 in 
Table A3 shows the sample size of mother-daughter pairs from each country. 
 We measure mothers’ private preferences, 𝛾 , using the answer to a question on whether 
the respondent thinks that FGC should continue or be stopped. If the respondent answers that 
FGC should continue she is coded as supporting FGC, if she answers that it should be stopped 
or that she does not know she is coded as not supporting the practice. A possible concern is 
that reported support for the practice is prone to social desirability bias. Relatedly, the 
respondent may express preferences that are in line with own past behavior (in particular, 
whether she has let a daughter undergo FGC in the past) rather than ex ante private 
preferences, to avoid cognitive dissonance. We will discuss these issues, and how they affect 
the interpretation of our findings, further below. In the remainder of the paper, we will use the 
terms private preferences for and support for FGC interchangeably. 
 Other important variables are those used to define the community to which the respondent 
and her daughter belong. As noted, social convention theory suggests that the prevalence of 
FGC in the community, or local marriage market, is critical to a household’s decision about 
whether or not to cut their daughter. How to delineate ‘the community’ is not evident, 
however. Ideally, we should have information about social networks constituting marriage 
market of observed households. Since marriage markets are likely to be defined by ethnicity 
and geographical proximity we define communities by region, ethnicity and birth year in our 
main analysis.13 In robustness analysis we also i) restrict the analysis to rural areas of the 
region, ii) define communities only by region and year of birth and iii) use communities 
defined by sample clusters. Independent of community definition, there is likely to be some 
                                                            
13 See e.g. Isiugo-Abanihe and Fayehun (2017), who study homogamy in Nigeria and find that 9 out of 10 
couples marry within their ethnic and religious groups.  
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measurement error in the community FGC rates, since they are not likely to correspond 
exactly to the relevant marriage markets.  
 Our main analysis uses 33 surveys from 11 countries that has information on ethnicity: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, 
and Sierra Leone. In the robustness analysis, when we use alternative definitions of the 
community, not based on ethnicity, we can also include Egypt, Mauretania, Sudan and 
Tanzania. When we investigate the distributions of community cut rates across communities 
and over time in a broader sample than in earlier studies we can use the data on respondents’ 
own cut status, which enables us to also include the Central African Republic, Gambia and 
Liberia.  
 Due to the data restrictions described above, the exact estimation sample varies across 
specifications. In the baseline estimations in Tables 1-3, the estimation sample consists of 
52,750 mother-daughter pairs. Table A4 shows availability of key variables for each survey 
round. Table A5 show summary statistics for mother-daughter pairs. 
 4.1 Measuring FGC in the survey 
The FGC data is based on self-reporting. Women report their own FGC status as well as the 
FGC status of their daughters. They also report their support for the practice. These accounts 
are potentially prone to reporting bias. As discussed in De Cao and Lutz (2018), eliciting 
honest answers in surveys is challenging, especially when studying sensitive issues such as 
sexual and reproductive health. In particular, a fair concern is that social desirability bias may 
lead respondents to underreport FGC and FGC support, not least because FGC is, in fact, 
illegal in many countries (see Table A1).  
 It seems reasonable to assume that reported support of the practice is more susceptible to 
social desirability bias than reports of actual behaviors, since attitude questions as opposed to 
questions on actual behaviors lack a clear-cut true answer. In a study of attitudes towards FGC 
in Ethiopia, De Cao and Lutz (2018) compare the outcomes of a list experiment designed to 
elicit truthful answers about FGC support14 with the answers given to a direct question about 
                                                            
14 As described by the authors, the method involves presenting respondents with a list of items and asking them 
to indicate the total number of items with which they agree. The control group receives a list of non-sensitive 
items. The treatment group receives the same list of non-sensitive items plus one sensitive item. The proportion 
of the respondents who agree with the sensitive item is estimated by computing the difference in the mean 
response between the two groups. 
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the same. 15  Their results suggest that answers to direct questions underestimated the FGC 
support by about 10 percentage points.  
 There are also studies on reporting bias with regard to actual FGC. Comparing the FGC 
prevalence rate obtained from gynecological exams in two provinces of Burkina Faso in 1998 
(Jones et al., 1999) with the FGC rate obtained from the DHS in the same provinces and year, 
Novak (2019) finds relatively small differences. The gynecological exams suggest an FGC 
rate of 93 percent. The rate obtained from the DHS data is slightly lower: 89 percent. While 
the difference is small to begin with, Novak argues that it may in fact be even smaller since 
the gynecological sample was slightly older (and FGC has declined over time), and since 
women visiting the clinics are likely to have more health complications than the average 
woman in these areas (and some of these complications may be the result of having undergone 
FGC). Similarly, in a study comparing self-reported FGC with results from clinical 
examinations in Sudan, Elmusharaf et al. (2006) found that while respondents were 
sometimes confused about which type of FGC they had undergone, there was no misreporting 
about whether they had undergone FGC or not. 
 To minimize reporting bias, DHS enumerators are instructed to use the local term for 
female circumcision (Demographic and Health Survey, 2016). Importantly, then, they do not 
use the term ‘female genital mutilation/cutting’, which emphasizes the harmfulness of the 
practice and as such might have discouraged respondents from answering truthfully. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that FGC is relatively common in most of the countries that 
we study. Figure A1 gives the country sample share of respondents that report to have 
undergone FGC. It ranges from 15 percent in Tanzania to 97 percent in Guinea. In 11 of our 
sample countries, more than half of the respondents report to have gone through the procedure. 
It seems reasonable to assume that in contexts where the practice is this common, 
underreporting should be less of a concern (see the reasoning in Askew, 2005).16 However, 
respondents may be more prone to underreport FGC in contexts where the practice is rare. 
 For the reasons described above, we will at all times recognize potential social 
desirability bias whenever we use self-reported support for FGC in our analysis, while we will 
regard reported FGC status as more reliable.  
 
                                                            
15 In particular, they ask respondents ‘Do you agree on the following statement? A girl should be circumcised’. 
16 Indeed, we cannot rule out over-reporting in countries where FGC is very widespread. 
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 5. Empirical strategy 
Our aim is to investigate the extent to which mothers respond to the community FGC rate in 
their decision about whether or not to cut their daughter, that is whether𝛼 > 0. In the main 
analysis we test implications of the fact that according to social convention theory mothers 
will sometimes act against their private preferences to comply with the social convention. 
Throughout, we will perform the analysis for the pooled sample and for each country 
separately. 
 First, we test the predictive power of community FGC rates on the FGC status of 
daughters in a regression that control for the mother’s private FGC preferences: 
(1) 𝑌 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑟 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐗 + δ + 𝜀  
where Y is a dummy specifying if daughter i from community c in country j born in year t has 
undergone FGC, and r refers to the share in the community that has undergone FGC, 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 
is a dummy which equal 1 if the mother support the continuation of FGC,  𝐗  is a vector of 
other individual-level variables (urban, Muslim, Christian, the daughter’s age and the 
mother’s education), and δ are country-specific birth year fixed effects. We cluster the 
standard errors 𝜀  at the region level. In line with Novak (2020), we define the relevant 
community as girls of the same ethnicity and region who were born one to six years prior to 
the birth of the daughter17. This is because it is reasonable to assume that mothers are able to 
observe the extent to which the procedure is performed on girls born a few years before the 
daughter in question when making the decision for their daughter. This should also help 
minimize the reflection problem (Manski, 1993). We use observations of both respondents 
and daughters to compute community cut rates.18  
If mothers respond to the community FGC rate, 𝛼 should be positive and statistically 
significant even when we control for the mother’s private preferences. However, there can be 
measurement error for both private preferences and community FGC rates, and if private 
preferences are less precisely estimated than community FGC rates, community FGC rates 
                                                            
17 The exception is robustness regressions where the community is defined by the sampling cluster, which should 
correspond to a village. In these cases the community rate is computed on everyone in the cluster older than the 
daughter (respondents and daughters).  
18 Typically the number of observed respondents exceed the number of observed daughters substantially, since 
not all respondents are mothers, not all mothers have daughters, and not all daughters are within the relevant age 
range. In total we have 851,708 observations of FGC status of respondents in the eleven countries in the main 




could pick up some correlation in perceived net benefits of FGC in the community even when 
we control for private preferences. Hence, to add private preferences to the regression in 
equation 2 might not be enough to claim that parents respond to the community cut rate. Our 
next two procedures should be robust to measurement error. 
 Second, we investigate whether the cutting rates of daughters are more extreme than 
mothers’ private preferences. We do so by plotting the distributions of the community rate of 
support for FGC and the community cut rate of daughters in the same graph. We order 
communities from the lowest to highest support for FGC and from the lowest to highest cut 
rate of daughters. In the main analysis, we define communities by ethnicity, region and survey 
year. As noted, if mothers who do not support FGC sometimes still cut their daughters when 
the community FGC rate is high enough, and conversely, mothers who support FGC 
sometimes abstain from cutting their daughter when the community FGC rate is low enough, 
then the community cut rates of daughters should be more extreme than the community rate 
of support. That is, we expect more bunching close to zero or one of actual cut rates than of 
community rates of support. The actual cut rate will then display a more discontinuous pattern, 
and it may cross the community support rate (being higher at high rates and lower at low 
rates). Note, however, that proponents of social convention theory tend to focus on the impact 
at high rates rather than low rates. They are less clear about possible costs of cutting your 
daughter when few others in the community do so, both in terms of marriage prospects and 
other possible social costs. Hence the curves may only approach each other at low rates and 
not cross. 
 Last, we test if the relationship between the cutting of daughters and the community cut 
rate is more concave for mothers who support the practice than for mothers who do not support 
it. If mothers who do not support FGC sometimes cut their daughters when the community 
FGC rate is high enough and mothers who support FGC sometimes abstain from cutting when 
the community FGC rate is low enough, this should be the case. We use binned scatter plots 
with a quadratic fit to illustrate the relationships for each country. To formally test if the 
relationship between the cutting of daughters and the community cut rate is more concave for 
mothers who support the practice than for mothers who do not, we run the following 
regressions: 




𝛼 ∙ 𝑟_𝑠𝑞 ∙ 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 +𝛽 ∙ 𝐗 + δ + 𝜀 . 
If the relationship is more concave for mothers who support FGC then 𝛼 < 0 and statistically 
significant. 
 Importantly, these last two procedures should be valid tests of whether mothers respond 
to the community cut rate even with misreporting. General under-reporting of support of FGC 
would not bias these tests. Alternatively, if social desirability bias is systematically related to 
the community FGC rate, we should expect it to increase the tendency to report more 
favorable views on FGC when the community FGC rate is high, and less favorable views 
when it is low. This would work against a pattern where cutting is more extreme than private 
preferences. It would also work against a pattern where more mothers who report opposing 
FGC cut their daughters at high rather than at lower community FGC rates.  
 Relatedly, if mothers report private preferences in line with past behavior to avoid 
cognitive dissonance, it should be harder to find the hypothesized patterns in the data, since 
fewer respondents would appear to go against their private preferences.  
 
 6. Results 
In this section, we present the main results, using private preferences to test the relevance of 
social convention theory. Next, we present the results of complementary analyses, exploring 
the role of intergenerational transmission of preferences, and the distributions of community 
cut rates – at a point in time for a broad sample of countries, as well as over time in specific 
ethnic groups. 
 6.1 Main results  
 Our main analysis uses private preferences to test the relevance of social convention 
theory. We first run regressions to estimate the predictive power of community FGC rates 
when we control for mothers’ private preferences. The community FGC rate is for 
women/girls who belong to the same ethnic group, live in the same region and who were born 
1 to 6 years before the daughter. Comparing r-squared in the different specifications in Table 
1 shows the high predictive power of in particular community FGC rates but also of private 
preferences. All specifications include country-specific year of birth effects, thus controlling 
for country-specific changes over time (say, due to legal reforms, information campaigns etc.) 
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Including community FGC rates increases r-squared from 0.306 to 0.526 (Column 1 versus 
Column 6), while private preferences (Column 2) increases it to 0.446. Including both of these 
variables (Column 3) increases r-squared to 0.570. Also adding standard individual-level 
factors, namely religion, age, urban residence and mother’s education, (Column 4) only 
changes the explanatory power of the model marginally; r-squared increases to 0.573,19 and 
adding region dummies (Column 5) increases it to 0.573. 
 If the community FGC rate goes from 0 to 1, the probability that the daughter is cut 
increases by around 90 percentage points (Column 1). When we control for mothers’ private 
preferences, the community FGC rate coefficient is reduced by a fifth, to 0.734 (Column 3 
versus Column 1 in Table 1), suggesting that the community FGC rate to some extent captures 
correlated beliefs that determine the perceived net benefits of the procedure. However, the 
coefficient remains both statistically significant and large. If the mother supports the 
continuation of FGC, the daughter is about 27 percentage points more likely to be cut. 
Introducing individual controls (Column 4)20 and sub-national region dummies (Column 5), 
does not change this picture markedly.  
Table 1: Predictive power of the community FGC rate and mother’s support for FGC for daughters’ 
FGC status (LPM coefficients) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Community FGC rate 0.902***  0.734*** 0.724*** 0.672***  
 (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.023)  
Private preference  0.457*** 0.279*** 0.270*** 0.265***  
  (0.037) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)  
Individual controls    Yes Yes  
Country#Year of birth 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Region effects     Yes  
       
Observations 52,750 52,750 52,750 52,592 52,592 52,750 
R-squared 0.526 0.446 0.570 0.573 0.579 0.306 
Mean of outcome 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504 
Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The 
community cut rate refers to the FGC rate among women in the same ethnic group and region who were born 
1-6 years earlier than the respondent.  
  
                                                            
19 To only add individual level controls only increase r-squared from 0.306 to 0.334. 
20 Table A6 show the individual level control coefficients. They are all of the expected sign, but modest in size 
in comparison to the community FGC rate and the mother’s private preference.  
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Table 2 presents the coefficients on the community FGC rate and the mother’s private 
preference from individual country estimations. Overall, the community parameters are large 
and statistically significant, most of them falling into the 0.6 to 0.8 range. The parameter on 
mother’s support for the practice is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for all 
countries except Benin and Sierra Leone. For Sierra Leone it is so at the 10 percent level. 
Coefficients generally fall within the 0.2 to 0.3 range.   
Table 2: Predictive power of the community cut rate and the mother’s expressed preference for 
FGC for daughters’ FGC status by country 
 Community FGC rate Private preferences N 
Benin 0.684*** (0.0810) 0.161 (0.0925) 4094 
Burkina Faso 0.614*** (0.0720) 0.293*** (0.0173) 6573 
Chad 0.769*** (0.0427) 0.266*** (0.0411) 2020 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.558*** (0.0692) 0.265*** (0.0335) 468 
Ethiopia 0.670*** (0.0544) 0.191*** (0.0454) 6391 
Guinea 1.175*** (0.148) 0.0615** (0.0209) 2770 
Kenya 0.765*** (0.0659) 0.258*** (0.0602) 2226 
Mali 0.789*** (0.0408) 0.239*** (0.0545) 10558 
Nigeria 0.677*** (0.0496) 0.482*** (0.0592) 3243 
Senegal 0.648*** (0.0363) 0.397*** (0.0388) 11623 
Sierra Leone 0.765**  (0.186)    0.143*   (0.0554)    2626 
Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The 
community cut rate refers to the FGC rate among women in the same ethnic group and region who were born 
1-6 years earlier than the respondent. All regressions include controls for individual-level factors. 
 
In sum, the regression results suggest that the community FGC rate is highly predictive of 
individual-level FGC status, also when we control for mothers’ private preferences. Hence, 
they are in line with social convention theory, which emphasizes the role of social 
interdependence. However, mother’s private preferences could be imprecisely measured. If 
there is more measurement error in the preference variable than in the community FGC rate 
variable, the community variable may capture some unobserved variation across communities 
in perceived private net benefits of FGC. 
 Next we investigate implications regarding the relationship between private preferences 
and cut rates that would be hard to explain by alternative factors. First, we compare the 
distribution of community FGC rates and community rates of support for FGC. Figures 1 and 
2 show the distribution of shares of mothers who agree that FGC should continue and the 
share of mothers who have cut their daughter in the same graph. The community consists of 
mother-daughter pairs who belong to the same ethnicity, live in the same region and are 
observed in the same survey year. Communities are ordered from highest to lowest support 
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and highest to lowest FGC rate. A pattern where FGC rates are more extreme (closer to zero 
or one) than private preferences is in line with social convention theory.  
Figure 1: The distribution of preferences for FGC and actual 
cutting of daughters in communities, pooled sample 
 
 
We can note that in general, the distribution of FGC rates is above the distribution of 
preferences. This is consistent with mothers cutting their daughters against their own private 
preference because of possible expected marriage market benefits or other social benefits. In 
particular it is consistent with so called pluralistic ignorance where people hold on to the 
practice because they believe that support for it is higher than it actually is (Bursztyn et al., 
2020).  However, it is also consistent with social desirability bias if respondents believe that 
the right answer to the FGC support question is that it should stop.21  
 Is the distribution of cut rates more extreme than the distribution of preferences? In the 
pooled sample (Figure 1) this is the case, and the two distributions cross as suggested by social 
convention theory. Turning to the individual country samples (Figure 2), the two distributions 
clearly cross in Chad and Senegal, and somewhat less clearly so in Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone. In Guinea and Mali, even though the distributions do not cross, the cutting distribution 
                                                            
21 It is also consistent with mothers having changed their minds since they cut their daughter. However, empirical 
evidence does not suggest this to be common. At least it is very rare that some daughter(s) are cut and other 
daughter(s) are not if the younger daughters have reached cut-age (Hayford and Trinitapoli, 2011). It is also 
consistent with mothers opposing the practise but not being the ones making the decision. Unfortunately we are 
not able to investigate this possibility with our data. However, Gulesci et al. (2021) identify mothers as the main 
decision-makers regarding daughters FGC in their Somalian sample. 
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is more extreme and more discontinuous than the distribution of private preferences. In Benin, 
Burkina Faso and Ethiopia this is not the case. 
 Last we compare how cut rates of daughters vary depending on community FGC rates 
(again among girls 1-6 years older than the daughter who belong to the same ethnic group and 
live in the same region) for mothers who support FGC and for mothers who do not. Again, 
we investigate implications of the fact that according to social convention theory mothers who 
oppose the practice will sometimes still cut their daughter if the community FGC rate is high 
enough. Similarly mothers who support the practice may sometimes abstain from cutting their 
daughter if the community FGC rate is low enough. This implies that the relationship between 
community FGC rates and cutting of daughters should be more concave for mothers who 
support the practice than for mothers who do not. Put differently, cut rates of daughters to 
mothers who support and to mothers who do not should be closer at high than at intermediate 
community FGC rates, and possibly they are also closer at low than at intermediate 





Figure 2: Distribution of preferences for FGC and cutting of daughters in communities, by country 
 




 Figures 3 and 4 show bin scatter plots with a quadratic fit of the relationship between 
previous community FGC rates and the cutting of daughters to mother who support FGC and 
to mothers who don’t in the pooled sample and in different countries. Table 3 shows the 
coefficient of the term 𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 from regressions of equation 2 in different countries. If the 
relationship between cut rates of daughters and community cut rates is more concave for 
mothers who support FGC than for mothers who do not this coefficient should be negative 
and statistically significant. 
Figure 3: Daughters cut rate by community cut rates for mothers who agree with 
or oppose the practise, pooled sample.  
 
Note: Bin scatter plots with a quadratic fit; The community FGC refers to girls from the 
same ethnic-region group who were born 1-6 years earlier than the daughter. 
 
Starting with Figure 3, the two curves are indeed closer at both high and low levels of 
community cut rates than at intermediate ones. Turning to the individual countries (Figure 4), 
this same pattern is visible in Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. 
Furthermore, in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, the two curves are closer 
at high than at intermediate levels of community cut rates, but do not approach again at low 
levels. The only country where the two curves are not closer at high than at intermediate levels 
of community cut rates is Benin. In Table 3, we can see that the relationship is statistically 
significantly more concave among mothers who support FGC than among mothers who do 
not it in the pooled sample and in six of the eleven separate country samples: Burkina Faso, 
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Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, and Senegal. In Nigeria the relationship is weakly 
significant, at the ten percent level.  
Figure 4: Daughters cut rate by community cut rates for mothers who agree with or oppose the 
practise, by country.  
 
Notes: Bin scatter plots with a quadratic fit.The community FGC refers to girls from the same ethnic-





Table 3: Testing if the relationship between FGC rate of daughter’s and the community cut rate is 
more concave for mothers who support the practice than for mothers who oppose it by country 
 Community FGC rate squared*Mother supports FGC N 
Pooled -1.316*** (0.141) 52,592 
Benin 0.107 (0.354) 4094 
Burkina Faso -0.427 (0.250) 6573 
Chad -1.483*** (0.209) 2020 
Cote d'Ivoire -1.202** (0.500) 468 
Ethiopia -0.280 (0.459) 6391 
Guinea -1.644 (1.256) 2770 
Kenya -1.661*** (0.224) 2226 
Mali -1.787*** (0.211) 10558 
Nigeria -1.784* (0.786) 3243 
Senegal -1.871*** (0.223) 11623 
Sierra Leone -0.137 (0.585) 2626 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Social convention theory predicts a more concave relationship between FGC rate of daughters and the 
community cut rate for mothers who support the practice than for mothers who oppose the practise. If so the 
coefficient on the ‘community FGC rate squared times support FGC’ variable should be negative. The 
community FGC rate refers to girls of the same ethnic-region group who were born 1-6 years earlier than the 
daughters. The full model also includes the community FGC rate, the community FGC rate squared, a support 
FGC dummy, the community FGC rate times support FGC, the daughter’s year of birth and age, religion, level 
of education, and urban residence.  
 
In sum, social convention theory implies that individuals will sometimes diverge from their 
individual private preferences to gain social or marriage market rewards. In line with this idea, 
we find that even when we control for mother’s private preferences, community FGC rates 
strongly predict the decision to cut the daughter. Furthermore, consistent with mothers cutting 
their daughters against their own preferences, the distribution of FGC rates is generally above 
the distribution of preferences. In most, but not all, countries, the cutting distribution is indeed 
more extreme and more discontinuous than the distribution of preferences, as expected from 
social convention theory, and in two countries, Chad and Senegal, the two distributions clearly 
do cross. With respect to the final prediction, that cut rates of daughters of mothers who agree 
with and mothers who do not support the practice should be closer at high than at intermediate 
community FGC rates, this pattern is confirmed in 9 out of 11 countries, but it is only 




Table 4: Summary of the tests of social convention theory including private preferences 
Test of SCT Support Not Support Mixed results Not  part of test 







 Cote d’Ivoire 







Ethiopia, Guinea  








Notes: *At the 10% level +Not included in Figure 2. 
Looking at individual countries (see Table 4), all results are in line with social convention 
theory for Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal.22 Evidence from Benin and 
Ethiopia are not supportive of social convention theory: the coefficient on the community cut 
rate is statistically significant even when we control for preferences, but this could be because 
of measurement errors in preferences. Evidence from Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Sierra Leone 
is mixed.  
 We carry out a wide range of robustness tests (see Appendix II). In Tables A7-A8 (and 
Figures A3-A4), we restrict our analysis to rural areas. Results are extremely similar to in the 
main analysis.  
 In Tables A9-A12 (and Figures A5-A8), we use alternative definitions of community. To 
be able to use also surveys without information on ethnicity, and thus include more countries 
in the analysis, we define communities using only information on region and birth year. We 
also define communities by sampling cluster. Given the smaller number of observations from 
a cluster, we compute community cut rates among everyone in the community older than the 
daughter in question. Hence, while we increase geographic precision, we lose precision over 
time. When comparing the distributions of private preferences and cutting of daughters in 
communities, we decrease the minimum number of observations per community from 30 to 
10. The overall patterns remain similar to in the main analysis.  
                                                            
22 Evidence from Cote d’Ivoire is in line with social convention theory, but the country is not in the analysis 
where we investigate if community cutting rates are more extreme than preferences, since region-ethnic groups 
are not large enough.  
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 In Tables A13-A14 and Figures A9-A10 we restrict the analysis to mother-daughter pairs 
where the daughter is at most five years older than the 95% cut age in the country, such that 
the time in-between the decision to cut the daughter or not and the mother’s expressed support 
for FGC in the survey should not be too long. Results are very similar to in the main analysis. 
 
6.2 Endogenizing private preferences:The role of intergenerational transmission 
Mothers’ private preferences depend on their beliefs and values. Theories of transmission of 
values and beliefs typically model these to be transmitted vertically within the family and 
horizontally from interactions with other members of the surrounding society during 
childhood and adolescence (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; 2011; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017; 
Giavazzi et al., 2019). Assume the simplest form possible and let the mother’s private utility 
parameter, 𝛾  be a weighted average of her mother’s private utility parameter 𝛾  and the 
average in the society where she grew up, 𝛾   𝛾 = 𝜋𝛾 + (1 − 𝜋) 𝛾 , where 𝜋 ∈ [0,1] is 
the weight of vertical transmission. The mother will then decide to cut her daughter if: 𝑉 −
𝑉 = 𝜋𝛾 + (1 − 𝜋)𝛾 + 𝛼 𝑠 (𝑟 ) − 𝑠 (𝑟 ) > 0. While we do not directly observe 𝛾  
and 𝛾 , we can use the mother’s own cut-status as a measure of 𝛾  (her mother once took the 
decision to cut or not to cut her). Similarly we can use the community cut rate where and 
when the mother grew up as a measure of 𝛾 . In Table 5 we present the results of estimations 
exploring whether there is a positive association between cutting of daughters and community 
cut rates when we control for the intergenerational transmission of beliefs and values.  
 We begin by adding the mother’s cut status to the regression in equation 2. We first do 
so without controlling for mothers’ private preferences and then add the control for mothers’ 
preferences. Note that we expect the intergenerational transmission to work through private 
preferences. However, we do not expect the mother’s expressed private preferences and 
mothers’ cut status to capture exactly the same thing. First, the mother’s cut status may be 
more precisely estimated. However, it is also a less complete measure since it only captures 
vertical transmission of values and beliefs, not horizontal transmission. 
 When we add the mother’s FGC status to the model that does not control for the mother’s 
preferences, the coefficient on the community FGC rate declines to 0.435, which is a reduction 
of more than 50% and larger than the reduction when we added the mother’s private 
preference to the model. Moreover, the coefficient on mother’s FGC status is at least as large 
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as the community FGC rate coefficient. When we also control for the mother’s private 
preference for FGC, the coefficients on the community FGC rate and on the mother’s FGC 
status decline to 0.383 and 0.368, respectively. The coefficient on the mother’s expressed 
preferences is around 0.212. All three coefficients are statistically significant at the one 
percent level. Separate regressions for each country are presented in Appendix III.  
Table 5: Predictive power of the community cut rate and the mother’s FGC status for FGC for 
daughters’ FGC status (LPM coefficients) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
Mother is cut 0.437*** 0.464*** 0.383*** 0.409*** 
 (0.035) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) 
Community cut rate 0.435*** 0.383*** 0.368*** 0.342*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) 
Mother support FGC   0.212*** 0.198*** 
   (0.017) (0.016) 
Country#Year of birth effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region effects No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 52,462 52,462 52,462 52,462 
R-squared 0.596 0.609 0.620 0.629 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the region in parentheses. The individual-level 
controls are religious affiliation, the mother’s level of education, urban residence, and age. The community cut 
rate refers to the FGC rate in the same ethnic group and region who were born 1-6 years earlier than the 
respondent.  
According to our model, we should also add a measure of the community cut rate where and 
when the mother grew up. In general, these are strongly correlated with current community 
cut rates, not least since we control for country-specific year of birth effects. However, we 
have information about the previous region of residence for respondents who have moved in 
the most recent surveys of four countries that also contain ethnicity data, Ethiopia, Mali, 
Guinea and Nigeria. For the sub-sample of mother-daughter pairs where the mother grew up 
in a different region than the one where they currently live, we can thus compare the relative 
importance of community cut rates in the region where the mother grew up to that in the 
region where they are currently living. The community cut rate when and where the mother 
grew up is measured by the FGC rate among women of the same ethnicity who were born 
from five years before to five years after the mother in her previous region of residence. We 
argue that this should reflect values and beliefs that were transmitted to the mother when she 
grew up. The community cut rate in the current region is measured by the FGC rate among 
the youngest cohort with available data, or, if this is available, among girls 1-6 years older 
than the daughter. We argue that this would be the relevant community to consider if the 
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family is concerned about marriage prospects of the daughter or the social rewards and costs 
that they can expect related to FGC.  
 Our outcome variable in these regressions is equal to 1 if the daughter is either cut or if 
the mother states an intention to cut all of her daughters. We use this outcome variable instead 
of actual cutting to increase the sample size, since the latest surveys only contain information 
on FGC status of daughters’ who are up to age 15 and we need to restrict the sample to the 
95% cut age when we consider actual FGC status (which is age 13 in Ethiopia, age 14 in 
Guinea, age 11 in Mali, and age 16 in Nigeria23). This leaves few daughters within the possible 
age-span (none from Nigeria). Table 6 presents the regression coefficients.  
Table 6: Comparing the influence of the community cut rate in the mother’s previous region to the 
one in the current region on actual cutting or intentions to cut 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Cut rate in mother’s 
previous region 
0.335*** 0.174* 0.114 
(0.092) (0.088) (0.090) 
Cut rate in current region 0.299*** 0.228** 0.127 
(0.105) (0.091) (0.086) 
Mother is cut  0.287*** 0.219*** 
  (0.061) (0.050) 
Mother support FGC   0.273*** 
  (0.042) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country*yob FEs Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.44 0.47 0.52 
N 1,205 1,205 1,204 
Standard errors clustered at region level in parenthesis.  
Column 1 in Table 6 controls for individual-level characteristics and country-specific birth-
year effects. Our preferred specification is Column 2, which includes the mother’s FGC status 
(capturing vertical transmission). Column 3 also add the mother’s private preference for FGC. 
When we do not include mothers’ cut status the coefficients of both community variables are 
statistically significant, in spite of the small sample size, and they are comparable in 
magnitude. When we control for vertical transmission with the mother’s cut status, the 
coefficient of the community where the mother grew up shrink and lose in significance, but 
is still statistically significant at the ten percent level. When we also add mother’s private 
preference, none of the community variables remain statistically significant, but this may be 
                                                            
23 It is age 18 in Tanzania, which we can also include when we define communities only by region and birth year 
in Appendix II. 
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due to the small sample size. Table A17 presents the coefficients from country-specific 
regressions. 
 In sum, our empirical estimations suggest that both social convention theory and 
intergenerational transmission of FGC norms are important to explain the decision of whether 
or not to cut one’s daughter.  
 
6.3 Investigating the distributions of community cut rates in a broad sample of countries.  
As has been demonstrated by e.g.  Efferson et al. (2015) and Novak (2020), community cut 
rates will be either close to zero or one only in the case where there is little to no individual 
variation in possible private preferences. The empirical analysis in Efferson et al. (2015) and 
Novak (2020) focused on Sudan and Burkina Faso, respectively. Following these studies we 
investigate the distribution of community FGC rates and how these evolve over time in a 
broad sample of countries. This can be seen as a test of a strict version of social convention 
theory, not allowing for variation in private preferences.  
 We first investigate the extent to which community FGC rates are close to zero or one 
with a sharp discontinuity at some threshold value of the community FGC rate, as would be 
predicted by social convention theory if there was no individual variation in parameter values. 
That is, along the lines of Efferson et al. (2015), we order communities by their FGC rate, and 
explore whether the share that has undergone FGC varies smoothly across the full spectrum 
or whether there is bunching at very low and very high cut rates (with few at intermediate 
levels), indicative of coordination. A community consists of women who belong to the same 
ethnicity, live in the same region and were born in the same year. We use the FGC rate of the 
respondents since this sample is much larger than that of mother-daughter pairs.24 Not the 
least, it allow us to also include Gambia and Liberia. Figure 5 displays the resulting 
distributions of community cut rates. 
 We can note that community FGC rates do indeed display a pattern consistent with 
coordination in some countries. In the Central African Republic, the Gambia, Guinea, Mali 
and possibly Benin, Senegal and Sierra Leone there is bunching at high and low cut rates, 
with relatively few communities displaying intermediate FGC rates. But in other countries the 
                                                            
24 To also include daughters for whom we have data on FGC status does not change the general pattern in any 
country (not reported but available on request) 
32 
 
distribution varies continuously across the full spectrum: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Liberia and Nigeria. In the remaining countries, the pattern is more difficult to interpret. In 
some cases there are few communities large enough to see any patterns.  
Figure 5: Distribution of community cut rates by country 
 
Notes: Communities consist of women of the same ethnicity, living in the same region and born in the same 
year Include respondents above the age at which 95% of cut women in the country were cut. Liberia does not 




 Importantly, however, Figure 5 does not capture changes over time. Yet there is a 
dynamic aspect to the model; if some exogenous change makes enough households shift 
strategy, there will be a sustained change towards a new equilibrium.25 Therefore, if we 
observe a community with 𝑟 ∈ (0,1) only once, we do not know if this is an internal 
equilibrium or movement along a path from one equilibrium to another. In a stable equilibrium 
𝑟 , = 𝑟 , . Therefore, it is necessary to observe the same community at different points in 
time to be able to determine if internal equilibria are stable, or if they reflect a process of 
change over time.  




Next, in the spirit of Novak (2020), we therefore investigate whether there appear to be stable 
internal equilibria where some girls are cut and other girls are not, or if internal community 
FGC rates are observations of communities during a process of abandonment of the 
procedure. We do this in a very straightforward way, by plotting the FGC rate over time (with 
the time dimension given by the birth year of the respondent), in all large enough country-
                                                            
25 As is standard in models with multiple stable equilibria (whether these are internal or at the ‘everyone cut’ or 
‘no one cut’ extremes), there will also be (one or more) tipping points (Granovetter, 1978; Zhang, 2011; Centola 
et al., 2018).  
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ethnic groups.26 We consider country-ethnic groups with at least 2000 observations and 
estimate the FGC rate for all birth years where we have observations for at least 30 women.27 
In total, we have data on 55 such ethnic groups from 13 countries. In Appendix III (Figures 
A11-A22) we present graphs showing FGC trends over time in these ethnic groups. We use 
visual inspection to classify the trajectories over time as stable high, stable low, falling, or 
stable internal equilibria (summarized in Table A18).  In Figure 6, we show examples from 
four ethnic groups that illustrate the main patterns: the Peulh in Guinea have a stable FGC 
rate close to 1, the Serer in Senegal a stable rate close to 0, The Kalenjin in Kenya a falling 
pattern, and the Sonrai in Mali a stable internal rate.  
 In total there are 20 ethnic groups with stable rates close to 0 (10) or 1 (10). Ethnic groups 
who are abandoning the practise over time tend to do so gradually. There are no rapid 
transitions from high to low rates for any ethnic group. In total 23 ethnic groups display 
declining trends. Most of these have started from high FGC rates, and as far as the data allow 
us to observe the process, the decline appears to continue until the practise is abandoned.  
However, there are also 12 ethnic groups who display a stable interior FGC rate. In summary, 
the results in the second complementary analysis are in line with a more general model of 
social convention theory, where heterogeneity in perceived net benefits slows down 
abandonment processes and where internal equilibria are possible. 
 
 7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we use a wide sample of data from the Demographic and Health Survey to 
investigate the relevance of social convention theory in explaining the persistence of female 
genital cutting. We show that the relevance of the theory cannot be tested using only 
distributions of community cut rates if private preferences matter in addition to social utility. 
We further show how it can be tested using information about private preferences. In 
particular, we test implications of the fact that social convention theory implies that mothers 
will sometimes go against their private preferences to comply with the social convention. 
 Taken together our results suggest that FGC is to a significant extent socially 
interdependent. Even if mothers’ individual values and beliefs also matter for the decision to 
                                                            
26 Novak (2020) uses a more involved approach where she aims to estimate the empirical relationship between 
cutting of daughters and the community cut rate to search for stable internal equilibria or tipping points. 
27 If we also include daughters with data on FGC status the general pattern remains the same. This is not reported 
but available on request.  
35 
 
cut or not to cut their daughter, they also appear to respond to the FGC-rate in the community 
that should be relevant for expected marriage market benefits and social rewards. Hence, 
social convention theory seems relevant for understanding the persistence of FGC, and should 
be considered when designing policies to end the practice. Our results also suggest that there 
is great variation in the extent to which FGC is socially interdependent. This implies that 
results that challenge or support social convention theory in one particular setting are not 
necessarily relevant in another. Indeed, while previous results for Sudan and Burkina Faso 
have challenged social convention theory as an explanation for FGC, our findings, based on 
a broad sample, suggest that the approach has strong explanatory power in the majority of 
countries. This in turn means that policies need to take into account local conditions in order 
to be effective.  
 When behavior is socially interdependent, it depends on expectations of what others in 
the relevant community will do. When it comes to changing expectations of others’ behavior, 
collective interventions that bring together community members are arguably more effective 
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Appendix I: Background information and summary statistics 
Table A1: FGC practice and legal status in sample countries 
Country Laws passed against 
FGC 
FGC types most 
practiced 
Estimated prevalence 
among women 15-49 (%) 
Benin 2003 II 9 
Burkina Faso 1996 II 68 
Central African 
Republic 
1966, 1996, 2006 I, II 24 
Cote d'Ivoire 1998, 2008, 2010 II 37 
Egypt 2008 I, II 87 
Ethiopia 2004 I, II 65 
Gambia 2015 I, II 75 
Guinea 1965, 2000, 2016 II 97 
Kenya 2011 I, II 21 
Liberia None (legal) II 50 
Mali None (legal) I, II 83 
Mauretania 2005, 2017 I, II 67 
Nigeria Legal status varies 
across states 
I, II in the south, III in 
the north 
19 
Senegal 1999 II 23 
Sierra Leone None (legal) I, II 90 
Sudan Illegal in 4 out of 18 
states 
III 87 
Tanzania 1998 II 10 
Chad 2002 (never enforced) II 38 
Notes: Information obtained from the Orchid Project (2021) 
 
 











up to 15 
Intention to 
cut 
Benin 2001  X   
Benin 2006  X  X 
Benin 2012   X  
Burkina Faso 1999 X    
Burkina Faso 2003  X  X 
Burkina Faso 2010   X  
Central African 
Republic 
1995 No information on daughters 
Chad 2004  X  X 
Chad 2015   X  
Cote d’Ivoire 1999 X    
Cote d’Ivoire 2012   X  
Egypt* 1995  X  X 
Egypt* 2000  X  X 
Egypt*a) 2005   X X 
Egypt*b) 2008   X X 
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Egypt* 2014   X X 
Ethiopia 2000   X   
Ethiopia 2005  X   
Ethiopia 2016   X  
Gambia 2013 No direct question about daughters 
Guinea 1999  X  X 
Guinea 2005  X  X 
Guinea 2012  X   
Guinea 2018   X  
Kenya 1998 X   X 
Kenya 2003 X   X 
Kenya 2008  X  X 
Kenya 2014   X  
Liberia 2007 No information on daughters 
Liberia 2013 No information on daughters 
Mali 1996 X    
Mali 2001  X   
Mali 2006  X  X 
Mali 2013   X  
Mali 2018   X  
Mauritania 2001  X  X 
Nigeria 2003  X  X 
Nigeria 2008  X  X 
Nigeria 2013   X  
Nigeria 2018   X  
Senegal 2005  X  X 
Senegal 2010   X  
Senegal 2014   X  
Senegal 2015   X  
Senegal 2017   X  
Senegal 2019   X  
Sierra Leone 2008  X  X 
Sierra Leone 2013  X  X 
Sudan 1990 X   X 
Tanzania 1996 X    
Tanzania 2005  X  X 
Tanzania 2010  X  X 
Tanzania 2015   X  






Table A3: The age at which 95% of cut respondents in each country were cut, and number of 
mother-daughter pairs where the daughter is above that age 
 95% cut age Sample size 
Benin 14 4,563 
Burkina Faso 12 7,635 
The Central African Republic 15 No daughter info 
Chad 13 2,619 
Cote d'Ivoire 15 886 
Egypt 13 21,992 
Ethiopia 13 6,691 
Gambia 10 No daughter info 
Guinea 14 4,672 
Kenya 18 3,420 
Liberia 18b No daughter info 
Mali 11 11,919 
Mauretania 1a 3,490 
Nigeria 16 3,470 
Senegal 10 15,974 
Sierra Leone 18 2,897 
Sudan 13c 1,817 
Tanzania 18 6,891 
a 95% of cut respondents were cut at age 0, but since there are still many uncut infants we restrict the the 
age to 1. 
bThe age at which respondents are cut is not available in the data. According to Yoder (2013) girls are ususally 
cut after puberty as part of initiation rituals. We therefore set the 95% cut age to 18. 
c The age at which respondents are cut is not available in the data. According to Efferson et al. (2015) girls are 
ususally cut before entering primary school. We therefore set the 95% cut age to 13.  
 
 













Benin 2001 1951-1986 X X X X  
Benin 2006 1956-1991 X X X X  
Benin 2012 1962-1997 X X X X  
Burkina Faso 1999 1948-1984 X X X X  
Burkina Faso 2003 1953-1988 X X X X  




1995 1944-1980  X X X  
Chad 2004 1954-1989 X X X X  
Chad 2015 1964-2000 X X X X  
Cote d’Ivoire 1999 1948-1984 X X X X  
Cote d’Ivoire 2012 1962-1997 X X X X  
Egypt* 1995 1945-1980 X  X X  
Egypt* 2000 1950-1985 X   X  
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Egypt*a) 2005 1955-1990 X  X X  
Egypt*b) 2008 1958-1993 X  X X  
Egypt* 2014 1964-1999 X  X X  
Ethiopia 2000 1942-1977 X X X X  
Ethiopia 2005 1947-1982 X X X X  
Ethiopia 2016 1958-1993 X X X X X 
Gambia 2013 1963-1998 X X X X  
Guinea 1999 1949-1984 X X X   
Guinea 2005 1955-1990 X X X X  
Guinea 2012 1962-1997 X X X X  
Guinea 2018 1968-2003 X X X X X 
Kenya 1998 1948-1983 X X X X  
Kenya 2003 1953-1988  X X X  
Kenya 2008 1958-1994 X X X X  
Kenya 2014 1964-1999 X X X X  
Liberia 2007 1957-1992   X X  
Liberia 2013 1963-1998  X X X  
Mali 1996 1946-1981 X X X X  
Mali 2001 1951-1986 X X X X  
Mali 2006 1956-1991 X X X X  
Mali 2013 1963-1997 X X X X  
Mali 2018 1968-2003 X X X X X 
Mauritania 2001 1950-1986 X   X  
Nigeria 2003 1953-1988 X X X X  
Nigeria 2008 1958-1993 X X X X  
Nigeria 2013 1963-1998 X X X X  
Nigeria 2018 1968-2003 X X X X X 
Senegal 2005 1955-1990 X X X X  
Senegal 2010 1960-1996 X X X X  
Senegal 2014 1962-1999 X X X X  
Senegal 2015 1965-2001 X X X X  
Senegal 2017 1967-2002 X X X X  
Senegal 2019 1968-2003 X X X X  
Sierra Leone 2008 1958-1993 X X X X  
Sierra Leone 2013 1963-1998 X X X X  
Sudan 1990 1940-1975 X  X X  
Tanzania 1996 1946-1981  X X X  
Tanzania 2005 1954-1990 X  X X  
Tanzania 2010 1960-1995 X   X  






Table A5: Summary statistics of mother-daughter pairs  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Mother's age 52,750 39.321 5.798 20 49 
Mother's birth year 52,750 1966.122 9.869 1942 1996 
Mother has primary education 52,750 0.151 0.358 0 1 
Mother has secondary education 52,750 0.068 0.252 0 1 
Mother has higher education 52,750 0.011 0.104 0 1 
Mother's FGC status 52,620 0.680 0.466 0 1 
Age at which mother cut 28,764 5.010 5.456 0 33 
Mother's private preference 52,750 0.396 0.489 0 1 
Urban 52,750 0.300 0.458 0 1 
Muslim 52,592 0.680 0.466 0 1 
Christian 52,702 0.262 0.440 0 1 
Daughter's age 52,750 17.942 5.318 10 38 
Daughter's birth year 52,750 1987.523 10.153 1955 2007 
Daughter's FGC status 52,750 0.531 0.503 0 9 
 
 








Appendix II: Robustness 
 
Table A6: Complete regression results table 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Community FGC rate 0.902***  0.734*** 0.724*** 0.672***  
 (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.023)  
Private preference  0.457*** 0.279*** 0.270*** 0.265***  
  (0.037) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)  
Age    0.004** 0.004**  
    (0.002) (0.002)  
Urban    -0.011* -0.015***  
    (0.006) (0.006)  
Muslim    0.031* 0.046***  
    (0.016) (0.015)  
Christian    -0.011 -0.016  
    (0.012) (0.012)  
Primary    -0.023*** -0.028***  
    (0.007) (0.006)  
Secondary    -0.063*** -0.069***  
    (0.013) (0.013)  
Higher    -0.135*** -0.143***  
    (0.025) (0.024)  
Community FGC rate 0.902***  0.734*** 0.724*** 0.672***  
 (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.023)  
Private preference  0.457*** 0.279*** 0.270*** 0.265***  
  (0.037) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)  
Country#Year of birth 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Region effects     Yes  
       
Observations 52,750 52,750 52,750 52,592 52,592 52,750 
R-squared 0.526 0.446 0.570 0.573 0.579 0.306 
Mean of outcome 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.504 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The 
community cut rate refers to the FGC rate among women in the same ethnic group and region who were born 





Table A7: Predictive power of the community cut rate among girls and the mother’s expressed 
preference for FGC for daughters’ FGC status by country- rural sample 
 Community FGC rate  Mother supports FGC N 
Pooled 0.728*** (0.020) 0.263*** (0.025) 36,820 
Benin 0.695*** (0.079) 0.186* (0.091) 2,446 
Burkina Faso 0.580*** (0.034) 0.307*** (0.011) 5,179 
Chad 0.748*** (0.058) 0.285*** (0.058) 1,238 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.580*** (0.058) 0.230*** (0.054) 228 
Ethiopia 0.718*** (0.069) 0.176*** (0.055) 4,764 
Guinea 1.113*** (0.052) 0.049* (0.025) 2,030 
Kenya 0.754*** (0.056) 0.271*** (0.06) 1,865 
Mali 0.780*** (0.054) 0.241** (0.071) 7,753 
Nigeria 0.675*** (0.06) 0.465*** (0.072) 2,006 
Senegal 0.646*** (0.038) 0.400*** (0.041) 7,671 
Sierra Leone 1.056** (0.262) 0.090* (0.032) 1,640 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The 
community cut rate refers to the FGC rate among women in the same ethnic group and region who were born 
1-6 years earlier than the respondent. 
 






Figure A4: The distribution of preferences for FGC and actual cutting of daughters in rural 
communities, by country 
 




Table A8: Testing if the relationship between FGC rate of daughter’s and the community cut rate is 
more concave for mothers who support the practice than for mothers who oppose it in rural 
communities by country 
 Community FGC rate squared*Mother supports FGC N 
Pooled -1.286*** (0.156) 36,820 
Benin 0.096 (0.468) 2,446 
Burkina Faso -0.409* (0.179) 5,179 
Chad -1.763*** (0.334) 1,238 
Cote d'Ivoire -1.312 (0.851) 228 
Ethiopia -0.296 (0.476) 4,764 
Guinea -2.829* (1.362) 2,030 
Kenya -1.639*** (0.236) 1,865 
Mali -1.726*** (0.298) 7,753 
Nigeria -1.384 (0.852) 2,006 
Senegal -1.738*** (0.261) 7,671 
Sierra Leone 0.413 (2.631) 1,640 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Social convention theory predicts a more concave relationship between FGC rate of daughters and the 
community cut rate for mothers who support the practice than for mothers who oppose the practise. If so the 
coefficient on the ‘community FGC rate squared times support FGC’ variable should be negative. The 
community FGC rate refers to girls of the same ethnic-region group who were born 1-6 years earlier than the 
daughters. The full model also includes the community FGC rate, the community FGC rate squared, a support 
FGC dummy, the community FGC rate times support FGC, the daughter’s year of birth and age, religion, level 
of education, and urban residence 
 
Table A9: Predictive power of the community cut rate and the mother’s expressed preference for 
FGC for daughters’ FGC status by country- community defined by region and birth-year 
 Community FGC rate  Mother supports FGC N 
Pooled 
0.692*** (0.024) 0.354*** (0.024) 74,231 
Benin 0.533*** (0.057) 0.207* (0.088) 4,277 
Burkina Faso 0.818*** (0.104) 0.303*** (0.018) 6,875 
Chad 0.756*** (0.062) 0.340*** (0.042) 2,204 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.394*** (0.075) 0.380*** (0.024) 623 
Egypt 
0.652*** (0.120) 0.455*** (0.054) 15,468 
Ethiopia 0.542*** (0.068) 0.226*** (0.041) 6,466 
Guinea 0.987*** (0.107) 0.068** (0.022) 2,817 
Kenya 0.606*** (0.076) 0.423*** (0.064) 2,313 
Mali 
0.828*** (0.051) 0.254*** (0.056) 11,35
7 
Mauretania 0.570*** (0.102) 0.452*** (0.055) 3,485 
Nigeria 0.811*** (0.036) 0.528*** (0.049) 3,448 
Senegal 
0.618*** (0.045) 0.471*** (0.044) 12,690 
Sierra Leone 1.129** (0.244) 0.149* (0.062) 2,871 
49 
 
Sudan 0.469** (0.147) 0.454* (0.189) 1,734 
Tanzania 0.692*** (0.081) 0.493*** (0.070) 2,371 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
The community cut rate refers to the FGC rate among women in the same ethnic group and region who were 
born 1-6 years earlier than the respondent; religion controls not included in Egypt and Tanzania 
 
 







Figure A6: Distribution of support for FGC and cutting of daughters by country - community defined 










Table A10: Testing if the relationship between FGC rate of daughter’s and the community cut rate is 
more concave for mothers who support the practice than for mothers who oppose the practice by 
country – community defined by region and birth-year 
 Community FGC rate squared*Mother supports FGC N 
Pooled -0.570*** (0.122) 72,497 
Benin 3.144*** (0.632) 4,277 
Burkina Faso 0.537 (0.345) 6,875 
Chad -0.755** (0.286) 2,204 
Cote d'Ivoire -1.153 (0.879) 623 
Egypt -0.422 (0.379) 15,468 
Ethiopia 0.044 (0.599) 6,466 
Guinea -1.354 (2.257) 2,817 
Kenya -1.248** (0.411) 2,313 
Mali -0.610* (0.322) 11,357 
Mauretania -1.287** (0.377) 3,485 
Nigeria -1.893** (0.722) 3,448 
Senegal -1.376*** (0.241) 12,690 
Sierra Leone 2.431 (1.503) 2,871 
Sudan -0.197 (0.710) 1,734 
Tanzania -2.083** (0.821) 2,371 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Social convention theory predicts a more concave relationship between FGC rate of daughters and the 
community cut rate for mothers who support the practice than for mothers who oppose the practise. If so the 
coefficient on the ‘community FGC rate squared times support FGC’ variable should be negative. The 
community FGC rate refers to girls of the same ethnic-region group who were born 1-6 years earlier than the 
daughters. The full model also includes the community FGC rate, the community FGC rate squared, a support 
FGC dummy, the community FGC rate times support FGC, the daughter’s year of birth and age, religion, level 
of education, and urban residence; Religion dummies not in Tanzania and Mauretania. So few Tanzania 





Table A11: Predictive power of the community cut rate and the mother’s expressed preference for 
FGC for daughters’ FGC status by country – Community defined by sample cluster 
 Community FGC rate  Mother supports FGC N 
 0.650*** (0.023) 0.287*** (0.021) 69,528 
Benin 0.443*** (0.044) 0.186** (0.072) 4,267 
Burkina Faso 0.621*** (0.029) 0.260*** (0.014) 6,287 
Chad 0.766*** (0.047) 0.233*** (0.042) 2,203 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.471*** (0.073) 0.334*** (0.023) 622 
Egypt 0.608*** (0.101) 0.376*** (0.052) 14,533 
Ethiopia 0.765*** (0.052) 0.147*** (0.035) 6,391 
Guinea 1.281*** (0.192) 0.059** (0.018) 2,802 
Kenya 0.641*** (0.067) 0.299*** (0.047) 2,309 
Mali 0.862*** (0.023) 0.172*** (0.024) 11,335 
Mauretania 0.637*** (0.076) 0.379*** (0.036) 3,324 
Nigeria 0.676*** (0.033) 0.343*** (0.02) 3,445 
Senegal 0.626*** (0.029) 0.379*** (0.029) 12,525 
Sierra Leone -0.060*** (0.009) 0.157* (0.065) 1,723 
Sudan 0.630*** (0.080) 0.296** (0.107) 1,799 
Tanzania 0.575*** (0.065) 0.393*** (0.058) 2,365 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
The community cut rate refers to the FGC rate among women in the same ethnic group and region who were 
born 1-6 years earlier than the respondent. 
 
Figure A7: Distribution of support for FGC and cutting of daughters  - Community defined by 
sample cluster  
 




Figure A8: Distribution of support for FGC and cutting of daughters by country - Community 











Table A12: Testing if the relationship between FGC rate of daughter’s and the community cut rate is 
more concave for mothers who support the practice than for mothers who oppose the practice by 
country– Community defined by sample cluster 
 Community FGC rate squared*Mother supports FGC N 
Pooled -0.965*** (0.174) 69,528 
Benin -0.147 (0.557) 4,267 
Burkina Faso -0.321* (0.137) 6,287 
Chad -1.603*** (0.198) 2,203 
Cote d'Ivoire -1.307*** (0.352) 622 
Egypt -0.486 (0.371) 14,533 
Ethiopia -0.315 (0.473) 6,391 
Guinea -3.089*** (0.756) 2,802 
Kenya -0.950** (0.359) 2,309 
Mali -1.892*** (0.117) 11,335 
Mauretania -0.510* (0.222) 3,324 
Nigeria -0.752* (0.313) 3,445 
Senegal -1.567*** (0.116) 12,525 
Sierra Leone 0.194*** (0.023) 1,723 
Sudan -1.289** (0.356) 1,799 
Tanzania -1.476*** (0.508) 2,365 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Social convention theory predicts a more concave relationship between FGC rate of daughters and the 
community cut rate for mothers who support the practice than for mothers who oppose the practise. If so the 
coefficient on the ‘community FGC rate squared times support FGC’ variable should be negative. The 
community FGC rate refers to girls of the same ethnic-region group who were born 1-6 years earlier than the 
daughters. The full model also includes the community FGC rate, the community FGC rate squared, a support 
FGC dummy, the community FGC rate times support FGC, the daughter’s year of birth and age, religion, level 
of education, and urban residence; Religion dummies not in Tanzania and Mauretania. So few Tanzania 
observations and no Mauretania in the pooled.  
 
Table A13 : Predictive power of the community cut rate and the mother’s expressed preference for 
FGC for daughters’ FGC status by country – daughters at most five years older than the 95% cut-age 
 Community FGC rate  Mother supports FGC N 
Pooled sample 0.677*** (0.020) 0.299*** (0.021) 32,873 
Benin 0.578*** (0.050) 0.151* (0.082) 2,426 
Burkina Faso 0.537*** (0.042) 0.329*** (0.021) 4,075 
Chad 0.680*** (0.047) 0.330*** (0.043) 1,347 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.551*** (0.054) 0.263*** (0.041) 351 
Ethiopia 0.652*** (0.073) 0.210*** (0.054) 3,461 
Guinea 1.066*** (0.189) 0.076** (0.022) 1,819 
Kenya 0.721*** (0.083) 0.288*** (0.073) 1,367 
Mali 0.768*** (0.041) 0.264*** (0.043) 6,362 
Nigeria 0.686*** (0.057) 0.467*** (0.060) 1,772 
Senegal 0.589*** (0.033) 0.430*** (0.038) 8,220 
Sierra Leone 0.732** (0.188) 0.129* (0.056) 1,673 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
The community cut rate refers to the FGC rate among women in the same ethnic group and region who were 




Figure A9: Distribution of support for FGC and cutting of daughters  - daughters at most five 






Figure A10: Distribution of support for FGC and cutting of daughters by country - daughters at 




Note: Cote d’Ivoire is excluded in this analysis as the region-ethnic groups are not sufficiently large. 
 
 
Table A14: Testing if the relationship between FGC rate of daughter’s and the community cut rate is 
more concave for mothers who support the practice than for mothers who oppose the practice by 
country– daughters at most five years older than the 95% cut-age 
 Community FGC rate squared*Mother supports FGC N 
Pooled -1.255*** (0.192) 23,068 
Benin 0.370 (0.600) 1,478 
Burkina Faso -0.274 (0.233) 3,201 
Chad -1.520*** (0.355) 893 
Cote d'Ivoire -2.621*** (0.664) 194 
Ethiopia 0.190 (0.822) 2,657 
Guinea 0.213 (0.651) 1,304 
Kenya -1.881*** (0.254) 1,128 
Mali -1.311*** (0.314) 4,693 
Nigeria -2.781** (0.968) 1,086 
Senegal -1.812*** (0.319) 5,415 
Sierra Leone -2.172 (3.036) 1,019 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Social convention theory predicts a more concave relationship between FGC rate of daughters and the 
community cut rate for mothers who support the practice than for mothers who oppose the practise. If so the 
coefficient on the ‘community FGC rate squared times support FGC’ variable should be negative. The 
community FGC rate refers to girls of the same ethnic-region group who were born 1-6 years earlier than the 
daughters. The full model also includes the community FGC rate, the community FGC rate squared, a support 







Appendix III: Complementary analysis on intergenerational transmission and on the 
distribution of respondents’ community cut rates 
 
Table A15: Predictive power of the community cut rate, the mother’s expressed preference for FGC 
and the mother’s FGC status for daughters’ FGC status by country 
 
Mother is cut  Mother supports FGC Community FGC rate N 
Benin 0.0992*** (0.0237) 0.570*** (0.0745) 0.155 (0.0941) 4094 
Burkina Faso 0.410*** (0.0500) 0.419*** (0.0640) 0.257*** (0.0152) 6565 
Chad 0.520*** (0.0514) 0.308*** (0.0496) 0.154*** (0.0273) 2018 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.337*** (0.0730) 0.293** (0.0964) 0.203*** (0.0357) 468 
Ethiopia 0.436*** (0.0571) 0.378*** (0.0969) 0.143*** (0.0326) 6306 
Guinea 0.353** (0.122) 1.108*** (0.127) 0.0573** (0.0187) 2770 
Kenya 0.127** (0.0370) 0.631*** (0.0864) 0.252*** (0.0547) 2225 
Mali 0.563*** (0.0574) 0.324*** (0.0664) 0.145*** (0.0172) 10558 
Nigeria 0.449*** (0.0708) 0.289** (0.0746) 0.318*** (0.0241) 3210 
Senegal 0.423*** (0.0459) 0.262*** (0.0464) 0.284*** (0.0273) 11622 
Sierra Leone 0.194    (0.140)    0.656**  (0.147)    0.138*   (0.0559)    2626 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A16: Comparing the influence of the community cut rate in the mother’s previous region to 
the one in the current region on actual cutting or intentions to cut – community defined by region 
and birth year. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Cut rate in mother’s 
previous region 
-0.050 -0.158 -0.095 
 (0.111) (0.101) (0.094) 
Cut rate in current region 0.444*** 0.340*** 0.226** 
 (0.118) (0.117) (0.093) 
Mother is cut  0.178*** 0.118*** 
  (0.040) (0.030) 
Mother support FGC   0.305*** 
   (0.042) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country*yob FEs Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.54 0.55 0.60 
N 2,856 2,856 2,856 





Table A17: Comparing the influence of the community cut rate in the ethnic group in the current 
region and in the previous region of the mother on daughters’ cut status (including intentions to 
cut)  
 
Previous region Current region Mother is cut N 
Panel A   
Ethiopia -0.051 (0.224) -0.010 (0.100) 0.116 (0.065) 313 
Guinea 0.685 (0.382) 0.408 (0.231) 0.351*** (0.075) 498 
Mali -0.074 (0.101) 0.243 (0.145) 0.653*** (0.123) 231 
Nigeria 0.240*** (0.045) -0.313* (0.124) 0.261** (0.099) 163 
Panel B – community defined by region and birth year only 
Ethiopia -0.163 (0.273) 0.401** (0.131) 0.108** (0.041) 363 
Guinea 0.411* (0.211) 1.170*** (0.138) 0.495*** (0.083) 511 
Mali 0.036 (0.104) 0.193* (0.091) 0.683*** (0.117) 279 
Nigeria 0.021 (0.413) 0.784** (0.207) 0.245*** (0.042) 323 
Tanzania* -0.038 (0.036) 0.075*** (0.024) 0.024 (0.017) 1,38 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the subnational region in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The 
regressions also control for individual-level controls and birth-year fixed effects. No control for religion or 












Figure A12: FGC rates in ethnic groups in Burkina Faso over time 
 
 






Figure A14: FGC rates in ethnic groups in Cote d’Ivoire over time 
 
 
Figure A15: FGC rates in ethnic groups in Ethiopia over time 
 




Figure A16: FGC rates in ethnic groups in Gambia over time 
 
 























Figure A21: FGC rates in ethnic groups in Senegal over time 
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Table A18: Classification of ethnic groups according to pattern of FGC rates over time 
 Stable high Stable low Internal Falling 


































Peulh, Burkina Faso*  
Gourmatchi, Burkina 
Faso 
















Mende, Sierra Leone 
Temne, Sierra Leone 
Total  10 10 12 23 
Starred 1 3 3 4 
Notes: We consider stable low to be cases where the cut rate is <10% and stable high where the cut rate is >90%. Therefore, 
some groups will be considered falling if the rate falls under 90% in consecutive years. A group is starred if it was not 
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